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ABSTRACT 
OV l ~.RY 
.~ SCHOOl. 
r5101 
The problem addressed by this research is that there does not exist a command and 
control system for the next generation u.s. Naval amphibious class of ship, LPD-17. A 
system is needed that coherently displays infonnation required by commanders to make 
timely and correct decisions. This research examines this problem in the context of 
designing a user-intelface display that will access data on the ship's underlying network to 
ex.ercise command and control 
The approach taken to solve the problem has four pans. First, system requirements 
were captured by interviewing 23 senior officers with command-at-sea e;t;perience to 
isolate design features they require from such a command and control system. Second, a 
mock-up display was designed based on these requirements; the mock-up was then 
iterutivcly tested in the fleet with subject matter experts to ensure it captured the required 
elements of command and control. 1bird, a user-intelface display was then constructed 
using a personal computer and Asymetrix application Multimedia Toolbool™; that is, a 
prototype was made without connecting to the underlying data. Founh, this prototype was 
then iteratively reviewed during design by fleet operators to validate that the command 
and control process could be executed from this workstation. The result of this research is 
a set of 18 example displays that will be forwarded to NAVSEA and the contractor for 
consideration during actual system design. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
lbis thesis addresses the design of a prototype human-computer interface for a 
command and control system which will be in place on the next generation 
amphibious platfonn: LPD-17. The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is 
charged with developing this interface, and has already produced a preliminary fiber-
optic based network, the Integrated Interior Communication and Control (IC)2 System, 
which v.ri1l provide the required data for command and control. This research 
incorporates data gathered during interviews of Commanding Officers of surface 
combatants; it evaluates and distills design features they would desire from such a 
command and control system. A set of engineering design recommendations is 
proposed for the system's infonnational interface 
The thesis has four parts. The introduction provides an interpretation of the 
general problem and NAVSEA's current solution to it. The second part reviews the 
methods used to eJctract, isolate, and integrate command and control design 
recommendations. The third part reviews the analytic interpretation of users' desires; 
how these desires were translated into system characteristics, and how these 
characteristics were incorporated into prototype displays. The final part, the 
discussion, critically evaluates the present method's findings and products, and 
recommends future courses of action 
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
This section discusses problems associated .... i th current command and control 
systems. It identifies the problems experienced on surface combatants and discusses 
why it is important to accommodate these problems during the design of new systems 
Two broad shortfalls account for usability I problems with command and 
control systems used in the surface Navy today ' 
• There is a lack of understanding about how the user reads, interprets, and uses 
information, and 
• There are few user inputs during the design process. 
By extension, these deficiencies are at the root of two common human-computer 
interface weaknesses' 
• User-defined information requirements are not readily available; as a result, 
interface displays do not adequately depict what the user wants to see 
• Information displayed in lieu of that which the user wants is often difficult to 
comprehend in a timely and efficient manner. 
A third related problem deals with the complexities involved with designing a 
system to support command and control on U.S. Navy ships. The warfare environment 
in which these ships operate is continually changing, ultimately compressing the 
battJespace time-line. This change in warfare, in the face of advancing technology, 
threatens to overwhelm the decision-maker during the process of command and 
control. Potentially too much information is made available and the user is forced to 
deal with the serious problems associated with inductive 2 logical processes. The users 
are forced to select small bits of information from the vast amounts of data available to 
comprehend the situation and reach a decision. When existing deficiencies are 
combined with the changing complexities of surface warfare, proper design of the 
user interface becomes one of the most important aspects to consider during the design 
and development of the system itself. 
1 Uu bility i~ related to thc e ffe~tiveneu aDd efficicDcy of &D interface, and to the 
unr ' s r e a~tioD to tbat iDterFlce (Hix, 1993). 
2 Inductive re,,""ODiDg invo lve. drawing ~onc lU!io n a From specific even ts. Tbe lex ic al 
definition of Minductive" is" inference of a ge neralized conclusioD from particular 
iD s tance, '(Webs te r! , 1990, pp. 615) The oppos ite of inductive reasoning is 
deductive reuoning - a conclusion reached [rom observ ing generalitie • . 
Tactical displays have not improved dramatically until the last few decades 
From the days of Nelson's Trafalgar in 1805 when messages were sent by flag signal, 
to the fleets of World War Two when radar and plexiglass grease boards were first 
used, much of the information that was passed along was hearsay, The data used for 
command and control was what someone else said, or saw In the recent past, and with 
the advancement of electronic devices, displays now can accurately depict real-time 
data; but while the typical decision process has not changed, the workload on the user 
has continued to increase. "Modem computer power has opened the possibility of 
augmenting, assisting, and supplementing the decision process of commanders by 
synthesizing for display the information on decision alternatives," (Snyder, 1993, pp. 
63) Effective design of command and control interfaces must ensure that computers 
assist in reducing the workload and help solve problems associated with decision 
making. 
The heart of the problem is straight-forward. Decision aiding interfaces used 
today often provide the user with 100 much dala and not enough information. As 
technology advances and the volume of information available to the decision maker 
expands, the user needs help to discern the available options from a tactical 
perspective. As present and future tactical encounters become increasingly complex, 
decisions and actions are, and will continue to be, time constrained; multiple decisions 
and required actions must be made in a matter of seconds. Decisions must be made in 
milliseconds and use all relevant information at the time. The relevant information 
must be isolated, redundancies and ambiguities must be eliminated, and the system 
must provide information when and how the operator or decision maker needs it 
Data and information are different, and this difference must be clarified. In the 
past, these two terms were used interchangeably, but today's saturated information 
environment highlights a significant difference in their meaning. The International 
Standards Organization (ISO) defines dala as " ... a representation of facts, concepts, or 
instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or 
processing by human beings or by automatic means" (American, 1972, pp_ 33) 
information is defmed as " .. ,the meaning that is currently assigned to data .... " 
(American, 1972, pp. 63) An effective user-interface is one that displays data so that 
information is effectively and effortlessly imparted to the user. 
To fully understand command and control and how it relates to the surface 
Navy, this section will review the following four areas' 
• The Basics of Command and Control . The traditional elements of 
command and control are discussed. Command and control is defined, and a 
model of how decisions are made is presented 
• Increasing Complexities of Command and Control . The reasons for the 
increase in infonnation flow and the changing complexities in conunand and 
control systems are explored 
• Case Studies: A review of user-interface3. Two studies are conducted and 
user-interfaces are compared. The first study reviews the incident ofUSS 
VINCENNES and the shoot down of a commercial airliner. This is an 
example of how the Navy's most advanced command and control-and 
weapon system-did not lead its users to the proper decisions. The second 
study reviews the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS), a 
computer based analysis and diagnostic tool used to monitor onboard 
equipment. This system has extensively involved the intended operator in the 
initial design of the interface. 
• Human Performance in Command and Control. How human capabilities 
and limitations come into play during decision making is reviewed. 
1. Command and Control 
The following reviews command and control to provide the reader with a very 
basic background in command and control-what command and control is, and what 
elements are involved with it Contemporary command and control components are 
first reviewed to familiarize the reader with what is commonly available in the fleet 
Command and control is then defined, followed by a model which displays the basic 
steps associated with command and control. 
u. Contemporary Comnumd and Control Systems of the Surface 
No"Y 
In the surface Navy, command and control systems that 
predominantly in use are products that were designed and built during the period from 
the 1960's to the 1980's-a 20 year period during which the application of computer 
technology began. Today, however, many of these systems are obsolete, in part, due to 
rapidly advancing technology and the long development cycle these systems required, 
and in part, due to the slow military procurement process. To understand the problems 
that exist with current command and control systems, it is imponant to know the basic 
components that are available to assist with decision making. Typical command and 
control systems used by today's surface Navy involve a combination of both computer 
based and non-computer based components to help the decision-maker. The following 
components comprise a typical media mix: 
• computer monitors or large display screens, 
• automatic status boards, 
• grease boards, 
• hand written pass-down logs, and 
• internal and external communications. 
Using such a media mix, the user is required to shift his attention between the display 
devices to retrieve essential pieces of infonnation. For a number of reasons, these 
systems-systems which should support decision making during the process of 
command and control---can be designed to better support the uset 
b. Command and Control Defined 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff define "command" as 
The authority which a commander of the military service lawfully 
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 
Command includes the authority and responsibility for planning the 
employment of. organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling 
military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also 
includes responsibil ity for health, welfare, morale and discipline of 
assigned personnel. (Joint Chiefs of Staff,1972, pp.77) 
This definition implies specific action taken by the commander---organizingforces for 
opti mal performance, directing force actions to accomplish a mission, or acting to 
achieve established goals. 
The commander exercises command through a process called command 
and control. Command and control is: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Command a nd control function, are performed through an 
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and 
procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Chiefs ofStaff,1972, pp.77) 
.commanders must be given certain specific capabilities that include the ability to 
communicate to higher and lower command levels, obtain, process, analyze, 
synthesize, and display information." (Adriole, 1990, pp. 67) 
c. A Model of the Command and Control Process 
Command is the charge of the commander. Command and control is 
the process the commander uses to exercise command. Command and control reflects 
decisions which enable the commander to impose or express hi s will to, or on, 
subordinates. A highly simplified approach which diagrammatically represents the 
command and control process is depicted in Figure I, on page 7 
To evaluate the situation and determine the appropriate response, the 
commander must fully comprehend his continually changing environment. The 
commander must assess the situation to determine how to act. In assessing the 
situation, he must observe the information displayed by the supporting system, process 
what he is looking at, and compare what (he thinks) exists with what must be done to 
reach the desired goal The commander must then decide the best course of action, 
and act. Simply stated, the commander must determine: 
• What is happening? And, 
• What can I, or should 1, do about it? 
Systems that are to suppon command and control must help the user with the first step 
of the decision process: they must help the user assess the situation. Specifically, a 
command and control system must assist in observing, processing and comparing 
information- not data-so the operator can make better, faster decisions. It is task that 
is becoming more difficult as technology advances and surface warfare changes. 
la.~ r>oes tbe rcpresentation reflect reality? 
~ lb.r=:::--l WhatdoeSthi. 'Sdat4I lmlOOking at.mean? ~WhatcanldD? (L: lc~ Whati-ltbceurrmtstatelamlll? compare What j~ the desired !"late? 
l. r-~"";';~:'" Whatl~tbcenvironment? I Assess I 
\) 
2 . ..-__ ... I Decide I Whatisl=tcourscuf actiDIl? 
3rl-"7A-',,-, 
Figure t· Model of the Basic Steps Followed during Command and Control 
2. Increasing Complexity of Command and Control 
The compression of traditional battlespace in littoral 3 warfare, coupled with 
the proliferation of modem anti-ship weapons has created a serious challenge for 
today's naval tactician, The human ability to recognize, evaluate, and react to the 
rapid flow of various types of information- tactical, own ship and administrative-
with non-integrated shipboard systems has simply become physically and mentally 
overwhelming. If decision aids are to effectively guide the user to make correct 
decisions systems designed to assist decision-makers must be designed differently 
than they have been in the past 
The changing role of the U.S. Navy continues to drive the development and 
production of new command and control systems. As stated in the Navy and Marine 
Corps White Paper ... From the Sea, "The future vision of the Navy will focus on 
strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and 
reconstitution." (U. S. Navy, September 1992, pp. 1) The demise of the Soviet Union 
and the rapid worldwide expansion of advanced technology to Third World countries 
have resulted in a rapid shift away from emphasis on open-ocean global warfare to 
regional or limited conflicts involving 1hird Word nations in littoral waters. 
a. Impact of Littoral Warfare 
The littoral environment is characterized by dense commercial air 
traffic and merchant shipping which presents challenges to command and control 
systems and their operators. This environment and the projected threat will challenge 
the detection range, reaction time, defensive performance, and display mechanisms of 
the system used against the threats. The battlespace in which shipboard systems are to 
react in will be limited (Ousbome, 1993). "Facing the future, we must prepare to deal 
with a foe at nmges so close that the incoming weapons are at best only II. few seconds 
away." (Owens, 1993, pp. 90) 
3 Littor. ! w arh re is the placement of traditionaHy op~n-ocean w arships in a coas tal 
environment in support of troop . on la nd 
b. Impact a/Increased Complexity in In/ormation Sy:;tem~ 
In addition to the rapidly changing warfare environment in which the 
Navy operates, each successive generation of warship has become technologicaliy 
more complex. Present-day command and control systems, and proccdures, must 
accommodate the explosion of data and the associated complexities of information 
distribution . In the near future, all voice, video, and data will be transmitted across a 
common medium- fiber optics. The subsequent integration of this data using 
common computers and databases will allow for the real-time display of any 
information that is conceivable. The challenge no longer exists in detecting and 
recognizing data but in selecting the essenlial informalion from /his huge amount of 
data required 10 make a lime critical decision. 
The more technology advances, the more complex command and 
control becomes. To ensure operators make the best and fastest decisions possible, the 
following must be accomplished 
• Improve integration and increase the automation of sensors, weapons, and 
display systems to shorten reaction time and coordinating responses. 
• Enable the Commanding Officer, and subordinate watchstanders, to direct 
and monitor the overall operation of on board systems in this environment 
(Ousbome, 1993) 
• Provide seamless command, control and communications to effectively 
operate in this complex sea-rur-land battle. 
Accomplishing these tasks will lessen the complexities, and relieve much of the 
burden associated with decision making 
3. Cut: Studies: A Review of Two User-Interfaces 
As the command and control process continues to become more complex, so 
does the process of designing command and control systems. The display element of 
decision aiding equipment-the human-computer interface that the decision maker 
will use to access data- is becoming one of the most crucial elements of design. 
The tactician of tomorrow is waiting for the designer of today to 
create a system that will help him unde~tand his environment so that 
he can fight a better fight and live another day. (Willey, 1988, pp. 292) 
Research into the elements of command and control is not a new field, yet the 
manner in which infonnation is displayed has not adequately focused on the end-user. 
Computer system interfaces must be designed with the user in mind. System designe~ 
must consider the human element. Data must be conditioned and displayed so that it 
becomes an effective tool for decision make~ 
In today's high.tech environment, systems can provide more data than the 
human can process. The mental act of processing streams of rapidly changing data 
from multiple sources often induces infonnation overload, a situation where more 
infonnation is provided than an operator can handle The same infonnation at 
sufficient volumes with insufficient time in which to process it can also cause a 
breakdown in communication between operators. As previously discussed, both 
advancing technology and the compression of the traditional battlespace have made 
the flow of infonnation virtually unrestricted. Interfaces designed to support 
command and control of surface combatants must accommodate and compensate for 
the possibility of operator infonnation overload. The continually complex and ever 
changing environment of the surface Navy demands that computer systems must be 
designed around the conditions in which they will be used. Command and control 
systems must reflect how human perfonnance is affected by the characteristics of that 
work environment. 
Two case studies follow. The first is a review of the shoot down of Iran Air 
flight 655-an A-300 Airbus-in the Persian Gulf in July 1988 by USS VINCENNES 
(CG 49)4 . This event clearly shows that the AEGIS weapon system interface-in all 
essence the shipboard command and control system---could have been better designed 
4 USS VINCENNES i, a Ticonderoga CIa .. Cruiser. This ship uses the AEGIS 
Weapon Sy stem. the mOlt adva nce d computerized shiphoard weapon system b u c<i 
around a 3-dim e nsiona I rada r Ant i-a ir warfare is the prim a ry miuion or thi. clus of 
.hip . 
10 
to accommodate the strengths and limitations of its operators. The system was not 
"user friendly :" the results were tragic. The second study reviews the Integrated 
Condition Assessment System (leAS), a real-time computer-based analysis and 
diagnostic tool used to monitor on board engineering equipment. This system 
successfully focused on the needs of the intended user by keeping the subject matter 
experts involved throughout the design process. 
a. uss VINCENNES: Was it Only Operator Error? 
The accurate display of timely information on U.S. Navy ships gready 
affects command decisions. This case exemplifies how the technologically advanced 
AEGIS Weapon System may not have effectively guided its users in making correct 
decisions. A summary of the incident is provided in Appendix A, on page 55 . 
(0 Design Weaknesses in VINCENNES' System. The written 
reports, published after the incident- including the official investigation conducted by 
Rear Admiral Fogarty- and testimony from a House Anned Services Committee 
review concluded: 
• the downing was "not the result of negligent or culpable conduct , .. " (Fogarty, 
1988, pp. 43) 
• the Commanding Officer" ... [acted] properly and responsibly in responding to 
an unknown threat, holding his fire until the last possible minute." (Hill, 
1988, pp,108) and 
• the AEGIS weapon system performed excellently-as it was designed (Hill, 
1988) 
The Fogarty report did not find any malfunctions by the AEGIS 
weapon system; however, it did recognize that specific pieces of equipment were 
misused by individual operators, resulting in erroneous reports of the aircrafts' 
descending altitude and IFF. Testimony from human factor specialists however, did 
find fault with the design of the AEGIS weapon system, " ... human error probably 
contributed to the accident, but not in the way the Fogarty report contends, '11 was 
human error', he says, 'on the part of the people who designed the system.'" (Hill, 
1989, pp. 113) 
Ii 
The Fogarty report did not find fault with the system; however, 
it is apparent from the result of this incident, the loss of 290 lives, that the AEGIS 
system- the "cutting-edge" of technology employed by the U.S. Navy- was not 
thoroughly designed with the user in mind. The report did not say that the AEGIS 
weapon system was not "user friendly" but the following events did occur 
• operators misidentified the airliner, 
• operators incorrectly determined that the airliner was decreasing in altitude, 
• operators misread the aircrafts IFF 5 , 
• operators incorrectly determined that the airliner was outside of the 
commercial air corridor, 
• one operator incorrectly pushed an action button 23 times trying to get the 
system to perform (Hill, 1988, pp. 204) and, 
• those in the chain of command on VINCENNES, including the Commanding 
Officer, did not use information presented to them at their consoles, 
information which would have accurately indicated that the aircraft was 
indeed neither descending in altitude, nor preparing to take an attacking 
posture. 
The report did not state that the AEGIS weapon system failed to 
display information in a manner that was intuitive to the user. That omission, however, 
is one of the conclusions which can easily be drawn. Had design issues, like the 
intuitive display of information, and human factoD issues, like mental processing 
capabilities and limitations, been adequately addressed earlier, the operators may 
never have been in a situation where so many disjoint errors would have resulted in a 
mistake of this magnitude. 
b. Integrated Condition and Assessment System (ICAS) 
The Integrated Condition and Assessment System (ICAS) will provide 
future generations with the ability to retrieve all required data about a shipboard 
.5 Identific ation Friend or Foe (IFF) is a n e lectronic cha lleng e and rep ly sys tem that 
u niquely identifies aircraft. This "ystem is required on all aircraft . 
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engineering plant from a personal computer monitor. This system is currently being 
designed by the NAVSEA, Controls and Monitoring Systems Group, and although it is 
not labeled as such, designers are using a user..centered approach to design the leAS 
interface. Intended-users with significant fleet experience have provided the basic 
requirements around which the system, and intuitive interface, are being designed 
These intended-users are the driving force in detennining the system characteristics. 
This type of design approach will allow designers to initially build and 
later modify the display in accordance with the desires of the users. It is essential to 
ensure that these user-defined requirements are tai lored from the beginning with 
consideration into how the intended-user will "see" and "process" these displays 
Human factors must be considered during design. 
4. Human Factors in Command and Control 
Human factors is the study of human behavior based on empirical 6 testing. 
The goal of human factors in interface design is to make systems usable. Usability is 
the optimization of human perfonnance by: 
• maximizing infonnation transfer, 
• reducing errors, 
• increasing throughput, 
• maximizing user satisfaction. 
Design of command and control systems must ensure that the display is 
intuitive and natural for the end-user. The user should not have to adapt to the 
interface. When designing command and control systems, human factors must be 
realized and accommodated. The display of infonnation elements is critical to the 
success of a command and control system. Design must focus on the desires and 
limitations of the end user. The fonner Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral W.J. Crowe, recognized that improvements were required in the command 
6 Empir ical i. d ef i ne d as relying on experience Or oben·Uion alone 
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and control displays of the AEGIS weapon systems. This recommendation came after 
the VINCENNES incident: 
.. 1 recommend that some additional human engineeri ng be done on 
the display systems of AEGIS. The objective would be to better equip 
it for assisting with rapid decisions in a situation such as VINCENNES 
confronted. .. It seemed to our inexperienced eyes that the 
Commanding Officer should have some way of separating crucial 
information from other data. Moreover, the vital data should be 
displayed in some fashion on the LSD 7 so the Commanding Officer and 
his main assistants will not have to shift their attention back and fonh 
between displays. (Crowe, 1988, pp. 8) 
a. Humnn Performnnce: Capability and Limitations 
Human performance must be recognized and considered, it must have a 
direct impact on the design of a decision-aiding system. As exemplified at the 
VINCENNES hearings 
.. the ship's sophisticated AEGIS radar and computerized battle 
management system worked properly, but that some of the men 
monitoring the screens and digital displays may have distorted the 
information they were receiving .... (Moore, 1988, pp . AI) 
For example, human short tenn memory is an intennediate stage of 
memory between sensory storage and long tenn memory that can last up to 
approximately 18 seconds and is limited to seven plus or minus two items. Moreover, 
to increase the processing ability, people "chunk" data; that is, data is organized into 
recognizable groups. By grouping information in this way, the human processing 
capability increases dramatically. Recognizing these strengths and limitations, and 
tailoring a system to limit the processing weaknesses and exploit the strengths should 
be a focal point of design for a user interface. 
h, Humnn Factors as a Force Multipller 
If not recognized, human memory and processing can become a force 
attentuator, thereby limiting capabilities and preventing the users from obtaining the 
7 Large Screcn Disp!8p (L SD', ) RIC 4 2~ x 42" w. lI mounted di.p lays used on A EG IS 
cru isers and des tro yers fo r comm and a nd contro l. 
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desired goal. By recognizi ng these limitations and designing human-computer 
interfaces with them in mind, human mental ability can become ajorce multiplier. 
By emphasizing the importance of human factors, complex systems can 
be designed to be "user friendly." Interface displays are the keystone of command and 
control systems and the decision making process on board surface Navy combatants 
Correct design of interfaces will strengthen and assist the ability to effectively apply 
assets in order to achieve military objectives, 
B. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
nus sub-section introduces a proposal to fix the deficiencies that exist in 
today's command and control systems, The Total Ship Integrated Interior 
Communication and Control (lC)1 program is a NAVSEA initiative to solve the 
problem of infonnation explosion on board us. Navy ships. This system will be 
reviewed, followed by a discussion of the Command Function- the display element of 
(lev (IC)2 will differ from existing command and control systems by providing· 
• seamless command, control, and communications because all shipboard 
components will be connected to a real-time fiber-optic network, 
• information available to the Commanding Officer and his subordinate 
watchstanders will provide the ability to monitor and direct on board systems, 
",d, 
• interface displays will consider the human element, human-computer 
displays will be intuitive yet provide comprehensible information 
1. NAV8EA'! lrltegrated Interior Communication and Control (ICP 
Sy!tem 
NAVSEA has designed and successfully demonstrated the abilities of a new 
information transfer system. The next generation amphibious ship---LPD-17-will 
have a complete fiber optic network system that will connect all shipboard equipment 
and sensors. The Integrated Interior Communication and Control {lCp System, will 
integrate the entire ship as a warfighting unit. The flow of data will be unrestricted. By 
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effectively harnessing the data that eKists on this network, the command and control 
display element, called the Command Function, will be a critical element in the overall 
system. 
Implementation of (Icy will replace the way current interior communication 
collect. process, distribute and display orders. Through the use of (IC)1, information 
will be available to assist decision making. The challenge is to correctly and 
methodically determine what to display and haw to display it to support the user. 
a. Description of (Iq2 
(IC)2 is the means by which future ships will eKercise command and 
control. (IC)2 permits individual ship systems to improve their connectivity and 
versatility by using newly available technology to improve conventional interior 
communication designs. This information management approach will screen, fuse and 
integrate all shipwide data into real-time information to aid in the command and 
control of the ship. (IC)lwill allow surface ship fighters to evolve from the traditional 
use of compartmented information into the integration of the ship as a total entity 
LPD-17 will operate for the first half of the 21stcentury 8 
(Icy equipment will pass all data, information, voice, video and orders 
between on board users. The components consist of: 
• a shipboard data network, 
• a video distribution system, 
• a voice distribution system, 
• the information transfer cable plant, and 
• tlu Command Function. 
The first four components are specific hardware that will facilitate the collection, 
processing, and transfer of data. They are not addressed in this research. The 
Command Function is what users will use to access (IC)'", and is discussed next. 
8 LPD-17 ha! an initial operat ion Ii capability (IOC) of 2002 
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h. Introduction to the Command Function 
The Command Function is the display element of (Iep. The Command 
Function will enable operators to exercise command and control from a workstation 
using real·time information thaI traditionally was unavailable, or at best, late. This 
display will provide fused summary data of shipboard functions to facilitate command 
and control. This workstation which uses a 25 inch color graphics monitor will enable 
its to monitor systems and provide guidance to others. 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
'This thesis provides prototype displays for the Command Function-the 
display element of(IC)l system. The design recommendations and displays will be 
forwarded to NAVSEA for consideration during interface design and development. 
The shortfalls that exist in current command and control systems are by-
products of a flawed design process. Systems in use today often lack a crucial design 
element, input and feedback from the intended-user to detennine the required system 
functionality. Systems are often not designed around what the user actually wants; 
consequently, the systems are not "user fri endly." 
The tenn "user friendly" in engineering parlance means "usable." Usability 
relates to the effectiveness and efficiency of the interface, and to the users reaction to 
the interface. To ensure usability designers must accomplish these tasks: 
• Detennine what the intended-user requires from a new system. 
• Establish a foundation of ideas based on the inputs of operational experts and 
the desires of intended users. Base the mock-up and initial prototype on these 
requirements. 
• Document these findings in such a manner that system characteristics can be 
outlined and so that other designers can further modify and build onto the 
system. 




This thesis develops functional specifications, including the required 
functionality and associated system characteristics, and develops prototype displays 
for the Command Function ofLPD-17. The method used to design those prototypes is 
discussed below. The process adopted closely follows a set of contemporary 
commercial design guidelines (Mayhew, 1992) comprised of five notional phases 
These phases are 
(1) a definition of the system's purpose, 
(2) the development of the functional specifications, 
(3) the actual system design, 
(4) system development, and 
(5) test and implementation. 
The present discussion addresses the second phase of these design guidelines, 
the development of the functional specifications. Functional specifications are 
determined by first identifying what the system needs to do from a user's perspective, 
then secondly, isolating the system characteristics needed to meet those requirements. 
A task analysis was used to systematically isolate and define the performance 
requirements imposed on the system by the operator. This chapter describes two sets 
of procedures employed for the task analysis of LPD-I7's Command Function. 
The first set concerns the five design phases and their associated steps, 
including a review ofNAVSEA's work on the (IC)l program. It then focuses on the 
methods used to extend NAVSEA's effort in designing the interface for (IC)l. The 
second set discusses the task analysis procedure itself and how it was performed. 
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A. DESIGN PllASES 
Mayhews' (1992) approach to interface design was selected because it is 
simple, concise, and provides clear-cut guidance. Moreover, the approach is 
commonly referenced in both commercial and military documents concerning human-
computer interfaces. Table 1, on the following page, depicts the five phases which 
comprise this approach a nd their completion status with respect to accomplishment by 
NAVSEA, and the areas which will be addressed by this research. The shaded portions 
highlights the two specific areas-the task analysis in Phase 2, and the mock-up and 
prototype in Phase 3-presently addressed. The tabl e shows that despite the 
accomplishments to date on "Scoping the System," the next phase, "Developing 
Functional Specifications," must be addressed. The main step in that work is to 
conduct a task analysis. 
B. TASK ANALYSIS 
The task analysis' approach adopted identifies the systems' functional 
requirements by observing and interviewing its intended end-users. In short, it solicits 
inputs from subject matter experts to specify product requirements. This approach 
studies the user's actions, work-flow patterns and demands, and evaluates human 
information processing limitations, user capabilities, and task chamcteristics. The 
results become the basis for the conceptual design of a high-level mock-up which, in 
tum, is iteratively critiqued by the intended-user. The task analysis therefore, is a 
critical step in the design process. If it is incorrectly done, the resultant system may 
not meet user expectations and operator performance cwld suffer. 
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Table 1: The Phases and Status ofIntetface Design for LPD-1Ts Command Function 
The field si tuations in which command and control systems operate are 
extremely complex, change very rapidly, involve diverse operator job requirements, 
and are typically characterized by extraordinarily high-levels of information exchange. 
Users' information requirements often tend to be stated in ambiguous, imprecise, and 
in a context-dependent manner. These user information requirements were 
systematically identified by interviewing a sample of officers who have had 
command-at-sea experience. Contents from the interviews were then subjected to a 
content analysis which produce a set of discrete information requirements. The 
following introduces the sampling method used and the task analysis' tools employed 
to express the required functional specifications. These specifications were then used 
to develop the prototype displays for the Command Function. The task analysis is 
described first, followed by a review of the method used to produce the mock-up and 
prototype displays. 
1. Sample of Subject Matter Expertl 
Structured interviews were conducted with fifteen senior officers-members 
of the Surface Warfare Officers Conege Command, the Senior Officer Ship Material 
Readiness Course, and the Naval War Conege-who had command-at-sea experience 
on a broad range of different ships. The communities that were represented included, 
CRUDES, Amphib, Minesweeps, Combat Logistic Force, and Carriers. 9 These field 
grade officers, Commanders and Captains, were chosen because they were subject 
matter experts with a record of consistent proven performance at sea, and were 
recognized as leaders in the surface community. The interviews were designed to tap 
what they considered to be the critical information requirements needed to meet 
command and control requirements for their respective ships. The interviews with 
senior officers were followed by interviews with 23 junior officers, Lieutenants, who 
had experienced duty at sea and who were prospective users of the Command 
9 Surface ship s are div ided in tQ grQups , CR U i.e rs a nd DESlmyeu are ca lle d 
C RU DES , amphibio u~ cap able ~hips arc called A m phib s ; CQ mba l Logi.lic Fo rc e 
sb ip s are u sed for supp ly. 
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Function. The goal of these interviews was to determine whal users thought was 
required from a system designed 10 fully support shipboard command and control. 
Extensive written comments were recorded during all interviews, and laler 
evaluated to discern patterns of responses which highlighted what these officers 
thought they needed to effectively execute command and control at sea. Moreover, the 
comments were examined to reveal desired design features absent from existing 
systems. The information needed to exercise command and control and the desired 
new design features were incorporated into the mock-up and prototype displays 
2. Task Analysis' Tools 
An analytic method called Quality Function Deployment (QFD) was used for 
the task analysis. QFD is a methodology aimed at satisfying the consumer by 
translating their demands into design goals. It is based upon a simple premise: by 
building a system around the desires of intended-users, operator performance 
improves. QFD. a design method is commonly used throughout industry, is briefly 
reviewed below before its application to the present research is described 
a. Introduction to QFD 
QFD is a way to establish quality in a product's design, manufacturing, 
and service; quality becomes a focal point in the initial stages of design and remains 
an important design goal throughout the products life-cycle. This approach bases 
product design on the demands of the user. It is a methodical plan for producing 
quality by reviewing the product at each stage of its design and development. The 
QFD method of design was adopted for two reasons: it uses interviews and anecdotal 
narrative data which are relatively easy to collect; and it produces detailed 
documentation as the method is applied. This documentation ensures that user-
provided data is readily available for the primary design phase and subsequent design 
changes. The system's final design becomes directly linked to documented user 
requirements. 
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b. QFd Tools Used In The TaskAnalysis 
Eight tools were used in the task analysis: the first four to detennine 
user demands, and the second four to detennine the concomitant system requirements. 
Table 2, on the following page reviews the eight tools. This table lists the goals, 
procedures, and the results of the application of each QFD tool. Operator demands 
were first identified using the following steps· 
• Intended users were interviewed to determine their demands. 
• User comments were translated into engineering design language. 
• The data was organized into Logical categories. 
• Specific characteristics needed to achieve the specific user-demands were 
identified. 
After this data was collected and organized, a conceptual model-the first mock-up 
interface---was made for review. 
The following section discusses the manner in which these design 
characteristics were incorporated first into the mock-up, and then into the prototype. 
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C. MOCK-UP AND PROTOTYPE 
User requirements identified by the task analysis were incorporated in the 
mock-up and prototype. Data from the task analysis and preliminary design decisions 
already made by NAVSEA were merged and depicted in a paper-and-pencil mock-up, 
which was the point of departure for an iterative series of design sessions. This process 
ultimately optimize user-acceptance by incorporating user-defined functional 
requirements. Given the absence of specific design guidelines for the initial interface 
design, the process used to translate user-requirements into the mock-up was intuitive 
It was based on familiarity with the subject matter, familiarity with the criterion 
environment, and a review of pertinent human factoB and computer literature. 
1. Design Tools 
The prototype displays were developed with Asymetrix™ object-oriented 
application Multimedia ToolbookTN.. The design was conducted using an Intel 486 
processor, Window Nf1Y operating system, and a 21" NECT"M MultiSync 6FGp high-
resolution color monitor. The prototype screens were printed on a Shinko CHC-S446i 
printer. 
D. SUMMARY 
Mayhews' (1992) approach to system design was adopted to develop the 
Command Function. Quality Function Deployment (QFD), a variant of task analysis 
methodology, was used to identify user's functional requirements and by extension, 
the associated system characteristics. Officers with command-at-sea experience were 
interviewed and their desires and opinions concerning command and control display 
requirements were solicited. These narratives were analyzed to extract common 
themes which fonned the basis for a mock-up of the Command Function. The next 
chapter describes the results of applying this methodology 
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III. RESULTS 
The application of the user-centered design method previously discussed 
yielded products: a set of user-defined system requirements and system characteristics, 
and the interface display characteristics derived from those requirements. Thefirstpart 
afthe present chapter discusses the results obtained from the task analysis. It presents 
the functional specifications essential for the Command Function; that is, the desired 
functionality afthe system as stipulated by a representative sample cfusers, and the 
system characteristics. The second part reviews the actual interface; that is, prototype 
display screens. Two screens are provided to exemplify how the user-defined 
requirements were incorporated in the design of this interface. The remaining screens 
can be reviewed in Appendix B. The chapter concludes with a summary of these 
results. 
A. TASK ANALYSIS 
The results of the task analysis are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. These tables 
depict summary data collected from interviews, and subsequently translated into 
specific engineering system charncteristics. These data collectively comprise the basis 
for the Command Function design characteristics. 
Table 3, on the next page, lists the task requirements and resulting design 
characteristics the system must meet from an operator's perspective while performing 
the job: that is, in exercising command and control. Table 4, on page 29, lists the 
design requirements and associated system characteristics of the equipment designed 
to support command and control. Both tables reflect the data collected from the 
previous steps used in the task analysis 
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Table 4. DeSign-related ReqUIrements and Assoctated System Charactenstlcs of the 
Command F u nction 
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B. MOCK-UP AND PROTOTYPE 
The mock-up and prototype were produced using the system requirements 
defined in the task analysis. These requirements were displayed in Tables 3 and 4. 
Recall that a paper-and-pencil design, a mock-up, was the basis for the prototype. The 
discussion now focuses specifically on the prototype itself. The prototype which 
evolved as a result of evaluating the mock-up. 
The prototype for the Command Function interface was designed in two parts, 
the background, and the specific screens. When observed by the user, the screen and 
the background appear as a single entity. Figure 2, below, shows the layering effect 
from an operators point-of-view. By designing the interface in two parts, screens with 
specific information can be layered on top of penn anent data elements. 
The purpose and associated elements of both the background and specific 
screens are listed on page 32. First however, NAVSEA's design specifications for the 
Command Function are reviewed. 
1. Operator Interface Design Specifications 
User views both 
Figure 2: Command Function Interface Design 
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The basic operator interface design features of the Command Function have 
been stipulated by NAVSEA (1994). These features include the use ofa 21 inch or 25 
inch high-resolution color graphics monitor with a touchscreen- in place of a 
traditional keyboard-for operator interaction. These two features, along with the 
user-defined functional requirements, are the basis for the prototype. 
2, Backgrounds 
The background was designed to display data required by all subsequent 
screens. These data elements provide amplifying information to assist the user in 
evaluating their environment. The background is divided into three parts to provide 
distinct separation of information elements. This separation divides information 
logically-as the user expects it- and reduces the possibility of operator sensory 
overload. The three groups afe: 
o tactical summary, 
o status windows, and 
• push bunons. 
The specific location of these elements on the background can be reviewed on Figure 
2, on the previous page. Although it is desirable to allow the user to configure the 
display as they see fit, these locations serve as the default. The main reason these 
groupings and locations were selected is that configuration reflects huw and where the 
user traditionally expects to find this information. Table 5, on page 32, lists the three 
parts of the background and describes their purpose and specific components. 
There are two backgrounds used for the Command Function, one used with the 
departmental screens, and the other with the special evolution screens . The only 
difference between the two is the choice of push buttons: the main background allows 
navigations to the individual departments, the special evolution background allows 
navigations to special evolution screens. Table 6, on the next page, lists the navigation 













• Condition of readiness 
• Materia/condition 
• EMCON posture and amp:1ific.8tioo 
• HERO posture and amphficahon 
• W:unt3..\! Weapon slatus 
- ASUW 
- ASW 
: U~ft~~k~t~:S · 





• Latitude lIIld LonSJtude read-out 
• Se[eclablcd,splay 
- rIM information 
- Wind display, or 
- ~eatherdi~play 
· E:U~~~:1il~~ein~~~~~t 
• Restncted M ancuvenng Label 
• Equipment 
'P=nncl 






• Combat Systems 
• Deck 





• Spec,al Evolutions 
Table 5: Parts of the Background 
From this background. The user can navigate to .. 
Main Default Anydcpartment~en 
Special Evolutions Screen (and background) 
Special£\loJution 




The individual screens display specific information as the user navigates 
through each. screen_ 1bis specific information is layered on top of the main or special 
evolution background. lbe screens themselves are divided into two groups : ship 
departments and special evolutions. 
The purpose of, and the display elements of the department screens are listed 
below, and on page 34. Due to the extraordinary amount of data present, the table has 
been divided into two parts, Table 7a and Table 7b. The purpose and display elements 
of the special evolution screens are listed in Table 8, on page 35. 
ScrecnPW"pOsc DIsplay Element' On Screen 
ADMlN Provide typical 
administrative data 




Pruvide data about 
cmbarkcdairclement 
Allow for monitoring and 
controUing of Combat 
System equipm~nt 
- pcr5QIlllcl andtainingrccords 
- past evaluations 
- instructions, n::fercnccs andrcpons 
-ticklersandtheplan-of-the-day 
• Tactical displaya - default range set al 40 NM 
• Aircrafi summary dIsplay 
- NC#/Brg/Rng/Fuel I Serial # or load I 
destination 
• Aircraft flight plan 
- integration of Air Tasking Order (ATO) 
• Weather inf?rmatirn: (cei ling, ~sibility, density I 
prc!lSUl"e alutude, wmd, dew pomt) 
• Flight deck status 
• Video selection - flight deck or weI! deck 
: ~:hs~~,:~c=t:~:~~~~ic 
• Graphic. dis!.'layofcquipment 
- on-hne, In stand-by, out of commis.ion (OOC) 
• Text field with abovc information 
'Ammunitioo!llatus 
• type fUld location, allowanc<:s; on board & training 
·Videose!cclion 
* Slatus window of background will automatically show 
the Engineering equipmcntdisplay 
DECK Provide slatu~ of deck 
n:latedcquipment 
• Tactical di~play - default range ""I at 15 NM 
- cmphasisonownships'boats 
• Graphic displ~y of stem gate And well deck status I 
- wclldeckdeplh/perccnl.bana.~ 
• Field WIth &a statc mform8tlOn, hangsr door stalus. 
life boat'latus, and anchor_<tatus 
• Vidco selection-well dock and vehiclcstowagc. 
Table 7a: Departmcnt Screens and ASSOCiated Dtsplay Elements 
Thetaclitaldi ' pl. yi. u..inlcllutionoflhe.hip.pooition,adigitatllllvigation chart, and lhe,adu 







Provide embarlccd Marine 
commanders information 
required for command and 
control of their troops 








Provide status of Supply 
Department 
Display Elements On Scr~n 
• Tactical Maps . intcgrat~d with taclical display 
• allow overlays 00 landarcas 
'L~d:gf~~a~re 
- wave number I serial fcraft funit / beachl load 
- allow for amplification on demand 
• Graphic ofpercc:nt ofMOGAS on board 
• Communication Field 
- circuit status and location 
• Go fNo Go button 10 direct troop movement 
• Push button to display LFOR.\.1 
- landing force opeI'lltional reserve material 
- ordnance fequLpment/I'lluons/fucl I 
• Summary field 
- pcrsonneloobollJd,seastate, equipmcnt 
• Graphic di~play of ship with equipment status: 
- equipment on-line, stand-by, OOC 
• Field WIth equipment information in text 
• Fuel f water f aviation fud graphs 
'PU9bbut~ontonlvigalCtoDftlllagc control 
.. Status wl.Odow of background will automatically show 
the Combat Systems equipment display 
• Tactical ~isplay - dcfaultran,ge set at 10 NM. 
- P~V1despecificnavLgallOodl;\lUlsonch!lf! 
• Call Slgnfield 
• Field with fix information 
• Status window ofbacl::ground wiU automalica\ly show 
the Enginccring equipmcnt display 
• Tactical display - default range set at 50 NM 
• CaUsignficid. 
• Push buttont~ di.splay battle group information: 
- responSlblhtLes 
- ships in company 
• Push button for messagerctrieval 
- allow query to database for received msg 
- acccss filesofstorcdnisgs 
- review new msgs 
• Push button to display schedules 
- intcgratcplan-of-the-day and~hcdule-of-<:vents 
• PWlh buttoo to access communicatIOn informauOll 
• Hotei sCl"Vice statu.:! 
• BudgetlJ 
• Supplies on board 
·PartsstalU! 












Prov i de ~lrequired 
infonnalloo for the llun~b 
and recovery of l ir~Ioft 
Toanehor 
!'mvide ~ln,quired 
informal1011 for the l aun~h 
and reCO\' CTJ of boats 
Damage Control 







Provide all require 
informal1on for safc: 
~~~~tion while at sea 
Provideinfonnalion 
required. for planning and 
conductLng an underway 
rq>lerusluilent 
To quickly and ~tfortlC3,ly 
transition the shLp into the 
most defcn.Lve posturc 
aV4l1able 
35 
Display Elements 00 Scrccn 
. 8o'clockreport~ormatiOll 
• 12 o'~lock report informatIOn 
• Navigation Display -like tacti~a1 display but ships 
hcidLngdefault.'l to tmc north 
· ~~;;:-;~th MvigahOn COlll"ses I speed distLl!lce 
• Field wi~ communication circuits 
• Fie1d with &Ilchot 5U.t1J.S 
• Tacticol display - to include own ships position, 
· ~d:% ~°ship~ala: CO l rig placement etc 
• FLeid displaYUlgmatenol for unrep I conrep 
• Status bar and timc-to-go displays 
4. E:umple Display Screens 
Two screens of the Command Function, Figures 3 and 4, are included to 
provide the user with examples of how user-demands have heen integrated with 
human factors to display what is desired-by the intended-user-in a logical and clear 
manner. The remaining screens are provided in Appendix B, on page 59. 
The first screen, Figure 3 on the next page, is the Main Default Screen. This 
screen will he used during normal operations. The screen is designed to provide the 
user with the elements normally required to exercise "routine" command and control 
These elements are: 
• a tactical display combining a digital chart, ships position, and radar 
surveillance 
• selection of ship specific check-lists' to guide the user through routine 
operations 
• a field displaying contact information. This pop-up field will correlate the 
text from the summary field with the actual contact location shown on the 
tactical display. 
The central focus of this Main Default Screen is on safety-of-transit, navigation and 
planning. Operations which require more in-depth information andlor guidance can be 
accessed at the touch of a push button 
The second screen used for an example, Figure 4 on page 39, is the special 
evolution screen Sea Detail. This screen would be selected by the operator when the 
ship is conducting or planning precise navigation. The information elements of this 
screen include: 
• a tactical display with additional in-depth detail normally found on navigation 
,ham 
• a pictorial display of the anchor status; the ready status of each anchor 
• a field displaying the course-to-steer, required speed, distance remaining in 
this navigation leg, and time-to-turn to the next course. Additional course 
information- the future courses and speeds-is also available at the touch of 
a button 











The results are a set of design recommendations and the associated prototype 
for the command and control interface--the Command Function---on LPD~17 . User 
demands have been evaluated and basic functional requirements associated with a 
surface ship command and control systems have been determined Using these basic 
functional requirements, system characteristics of the Command Function were 
determined. These characteristics were tailored to meet the user~defined requirements, 




The prototype display screens for LPD-lTs Command Function, produced by 
the method adopted in this study, were presented and briefly discussed in the previous 
chapter. These displays are the tangible products afthis design effort; but as noted here 
the selection and use of the design method itself departed from conventional practice. 
This chapter addresses the salient aspects of the design method adopted herein and 
uses the prototype display screens as a basis from which to discuss its general concepts 
and principles. The first section places the prototype screens in context; that is, they 
really reflect only a first generation design effort. The second section contrasts the 
current method with others commonly used today. 
A. PROTOTYPE DISPLAY SCREENS 
The two screens presented in the previous chapter reflect a careful accounting 
of user-demands and an incorporation of accepted design principles_ These screens, 
however, are first generation displays and their design will require additional iterations 
during the remaining design phase itself, and later, during developmental and 
operational test and evaluation of the integrated system. The displays were designed 
based on inputs of the intended-users and shaped by technical literature from the fields 
of computer science and human factors. Again, these products reflect activity at the 
very beginning of the design phase. By presenting this first generation prototype to the 
intended-operator at this early design stage, the interface will be subjected to 
modifications based both on user-requirements and relevant technical literature. 
Accordingly, time is not wasted at a later and more costly, stage of development. This 
rudimentary interface is simply a point-of-departure for subsequent design 
enhancements 
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The screens themselves reflect straight.forward design objectives. The 
arrangements of infonnational elements were designed to enable operators to access 
the infonnation they need to efficiently and effectively exercise command and control 
on LPD·17. This stage of design took an iterative approach. Operational experts 
repeatedly evaluated the d£sign to ensure /he interfaces provid£d what they wanted. 
and displayed this information in a manner they clearly understood. 
B. DESIGN METHOD 
The interface between the operator and shipboard command and control 
systems is frequently cited as the weak link in the overall design of the integrated 
systems. To date, no particular school of design guidance has been accepted in either 
the rapidly advancing commercial sector, or the slow and methodical acquisition 
procedures of the Department of Defense. Computer system interfaces need to be 
designed around user-requirements to ensure acceptance, they must be "usable." 
Selecting an interface design method must ultimately produce a "usable" 
system. User-centered methods provide the required iteratations during design and 
development to collect, represent, and analyze data obtained from the intended users. 
This process increases the likelihood that the resulting interface will display what the 
intended user actually wants, and consequently operator perfonnance should improve 
as users come to rely on the system. 
The design methods employed to produce today's computer interfaces for the 
surface Navy often do little to ensure cognitive compatibility, which is the extent that 
an interface accomplishes a task in the manner the user expects to accomplish that 
task. The resulting interfaces are, in general, not considered "user friendly" . In fact, 
end-usets often wonder whether designers solicited opinions from fleet users during 
the design or if the interface was designed in a "box;" that is, in isolation. To provide a 
basis for comparison, the common method used today in interface design is contrasted 
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with the method used in the present research-a method committed to user-centered 
design. 
1. Methods Used Today 
Approaches employed to design interfaces today typically do not use 
procedures needed by designers to ensure that the systems' broad design objectives 
meet a fleet operator's requirements. There is insufficient design guidance and few 
design tools available to interface developers for them to consistently make fleet-
relevant decisions during the design process. In military procurement programs, which 
are typically constrained by inflexible schedules and an intolerance to cost over-runs, 
designers tend to make decisions from a narrow technical engineering perspective 
which may not reflect a boarder operationalj7eet perspective. Many interfaces used in 
the sUlface Navy reflect this narrow engineering design perspective 
The practice of relying on a contractor-typically cost and time constrained 
and removed from the fleet-to determine both system functionality and subsequently 
system design, is common. This practice of simultaneously relying on contractors, 
while not ensuring they solicit current fleet input, has an accepted practice in the face 
of increasingly complex systems, and increasingly complex informational 
requirements, both of which in tum are imposed by increasingly complex mission 
requirements. It is the operator, and by extension the mission, that is adversely 
impacted. Fleet personnel will readily adapt to design short-falls, but often, it is at the 
expense of mission capabilities. Generally operators are unaware of design 
alternatives, they use the tools that are available " .... they generally accept the result 
because when you give them an application, the way it looks is the way it is." (Nielsen, 
1994, pp. 378) Clearly, it is incumbent on the designers to provide the fleet with 
carefully considered designs which arc fleet validated. 
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a. Reliance on Contractors in Determining System Functionality 
Relying on the commercial sector as the dominant source of design 
input is a poor way to determine system requirements. Although the commercial 
sector, or more specifically contractors, is often staffed with retired or ex-military 
personnel, these same people may not reflect today's fleet operators. More specifically, 
the methods currently used by contractors are often personnel dependent. Employees' 
memories, the breadth of their individual experiences, and the extent to which they can 
associate with their fleet counterparts become the foundation on which design 
solutions to contemporary problems are based (Nielsen, 1994). This method of design 
limits the range of possible solutions. Moreover, an experience dependent approach 
may possibly perpetuate design errors unrecognized in predecessor systems. 
Given the rapidity with which technology is advancing, design ideas, 
and both developmental and operational test and evaluation, must be based on today's 
fleet. An iterative approach must be used to solicit inputs from both master-level 
operators- users oj predecessor systems----and journeyman-level operators-
intended-users ojthe new system. For the Command Function, the master is typically a 
Captain or Commander with command experience, and the journeyman is today's 
Lieutenant. 
These groups have generational differences. Generational differences 
are perhaps best exemplified by the users' "trust" in a new computer system. 
Differences in "trust" may simply reflect newer generations having greater access to, 
and consequently more use of,like systems. This variation in perspective can result in 
subtle differences in the system design features desired by the operator. The functional 
requirements of both groups must be met. Meeting those requirements entails a clear 
emphasis on what is euphemistically called "user-centered" design. 
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2. Usn-Centered Design 
The design process reflected in this research is a method based on user-
centered design. It is not essential that one particular method is chosen over another, as 
long the method that is chosen focuses on the user and accommodates their 
preferences and requirements. In this regard, the present effort used Mayhew's (1992) 
guidance, and by following its prescribed steps used the associated guidelines for an 
iterative approach to design 
The focal point of user-centered design is obviously the user. For this approach 
to be successful, designeI1l must understand the user. If they understand both 
demographic characteristics and fundamental job requirements, they then are 
positioned to actively solicit meaningful input for design. Fleet input, including initial 
ideas and subsequent evaluation, becomes the predominant criterion on which design 
decisions are based. User-detennined requirements are solicited from both subject 
matter experts and the intended-operators. These anecdotal accounts of operators' 
desires are then balanced with basic design principles. Transfonning the users' desires 
into system characteristics, and balancing these ideas with established design 
principles ensures usability. Models are used to represent system functionality and are 
iteratively evaluated by the user to assure fleet relevance. Two procedural elements of 
design, the sample of users which affect the design process, and the set of design 
principles used to produce the initial prototype are critical to the overall process. 
u. Sample of Users 
An important design element is gathering and interpreting fleet input 
In the present case, inputs from subject matter experts located at the Naval Education 
and Training Center at Newport, Rhode Island were solicited. The Command Function 
itself is a tool used to support the command and control process. Naval organizations 
in Newport presented a broad range of diverse experience on command and control 
As previously reported, extensive interviews were conducted with members of the 
Surface Warfare Officers College Command Staff, the Senior Officer Ship Material 
Readiness Course, and the Naval War College. Junior Officers, the eventual intended-
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users of the Command Function. were found throughout the waterfront and on afloat 
units. Another excellent and concentrated source of junior officers was found at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey. This School provided readily 
accessible volunteers with diverse backgrounds. Subject matter experts from these 
sources provided inputs to the design which reflect not only diverse technical 
backgrounds, but inter-generational aspects as well. 
b. Basic Design Principles 
The basic principles used for the design of the Command Function 
interface are listed in Table 9, on page 50. These principles are a summary of ideas 
collected from the technical englneering literature encompassing interface design and 
from the common desires of fleet personnel. 
Co Future Research 
LPD-l7's Command Function interface is by no means complete. The 
prototype displays produced by this research are an initial step in the design phase 
Further design is needed before the development phase begins and NPS can provide 
this work. NPS can provide subject matter experts with recent fleet experience and the 
technical design expertise needed to integrate this fleet experience with engineering 
principles to achieve the desired user-centered results. Student officers at NPS have a 
selfish interest to ensure that quality products are provided to the fleet, as they will 
soon return to sea. The six recommendations which follow provide additional avenues 
for further research at NPS . 
• Eumine the information element! displayed on each screen. Continue to 
solicit fleet input to determine missing elements and to critique current 
displays. Verify that the colors, shapes, and layouts used to simulate the 
traditional environment are accurate. Modify and update the displays during 
this iterative process . 
• Evaluated the prototype display in a realistic: shipboard environment. 
Allow intended-users to "play" with the prototype display in a shipboard 
environment. Real-time data is not required, operators will be evaluating the 
display screens. 
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• Conduct additional analysis of the data collected during the functional 
specifications. Review the data collected and weigh the user-determined 
functionality against the system characteristics. Use a method like QFD to 
detennine the importance of each user-demand . Compare the results of the 
analysis with the prototype displays 
• Review the system display characteristics to determine which items a 
user might need to tailor. Review the situations this interface will be used 
in. and identify the particular elements an operator might need to change. 
• Conduct Laboratory Experimenh. Determine optimum displays to provide 
rapid recognition and maximum infonnation transfer. Review how the use of 
color. shapes and information layout affects the users' perception of the 
displayed infonnation. 
• Determine required element refresh rate. Detennine the minimum graphic 
refresh rate for each specific display element. 
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OF SYSTEM STATUS 
Meaning 
"Makcthejobeasierand 
bettcr for the user, lIS 
determined by the user." 
"Display informfttion 
not datA." 






visible or easily 
retrievable." 
"Do not provide 
irrelevant infonnation." 
"Keep user informed of 
what is going on." 
Way to accomplish 
o Know the user 
o Involve subject matter experts, 
intended-users, and human 
factors experts during design 
o Define requirements in the fieet 
o Provide a system model for 
enUque 
o Do not o,'erload !.he user 
o Use cognitive directness 
o Draw on real world analogies 
o Organize displays to manage 
complexity 
o Use pictures instead of text 
o Display information the way the 
user expects it 
o Access information logically 
o Do not require the user to learn 
new methods I tools 
o Be consistent 
o Keep displays simple 
o Usc traditional colors I icons I 
shapes I coding 
o Show thc user what they expect 
o Do not require the user to 
remember information 
displayed elscwherc 
o Provide all the tools required to 
perform a task 
o Contain only the information 
that is needed for that task 
o Provide feed back to !.he user 
Table 9: Usability Pnnclples for DeSign 
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C. CHAPTER SUl\fMARY 
A system design which focuses on the demands and desires of the intended-
user is more likely to succeed than one which bases design decisions on limited 
technical and engineering inputs. By isolating and accommodating the user's desires 
the interface will ultimately reflect what users want; therefore the likelihood that the 
interface will be both usable and relied on will increase. User-interfaces employed on 
board surface ships must reflect the desires and demands of the fleet. User input during 
the initial design and subsequent development is the key to both fleet acceptance and 
the production of a quality interface 
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v. SUM:wARY AND CONCLUSION 
The environment in which command and control decisions are made on board 
Navy ships is extremely complex. The advent of automated computer processing has 
increased the amount of data available to the operator; but this increase in volume has 
not reduced the associated workload on the operator. Changing mission requirements 
and technological advances have imposed additional responsibilities on the 
commander. Computer systems can he used to effectively harness the voluminous 
amounts of data and assist the operator in exercising command and control. The 
keystone to ship board command and control systems is the interface--the 
electronically mediated workspace used by the operator to access the underlying data. 
To effectively design and build a user interface designers must understand both 
the required elements of ship board command and control, and also the way these 
elements are used during the command and control process. Following systematic 
design procedures, these mission essential elements are captured and translated into 
system characteristics. This research followed a set of systematic design procedures 
and produced a prototype interface for command and control on board LPD-17. This 
prototype is the beginning of the design phase. It is a design based on two simple 
straight-fotward considerations: provide what the user wants, and tailor those wants 
with acceptable design principles. 
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APPENDIX A. THE VINCENNES INCIDENT 
The following condensed details of the downing afImn Air flight 655 by USS 
VINCENh'ES are taken directly from the official investigation. (Fogany, 1988.): 
Summary: 
On 3 July 1988, the USS VINCENNES (eG 49), operating in (he 
Southem Persian Gulf as a unit assigned to Commander, Joint 1bsk 
Force Middle East, downed a civilian airliner, [ran Air flight 655 on a 
routine scheduled jIight from Bandar Abbas to Dubai, with two SM-2 
missiles/O. 
Background scenario: 
In Ihe three day period prior to the incident. there was heightened 
air and naval activity in the Per.sian Gulf. Iraq conducted airs/rikes 
against Iranian ai/facilities and shipping 30 June through 2 July 1988. 
Iranian response was to step up .~hip attacks. Additionally, Iran 
deployed F-14'sfrom Bushehr to Bandar Abbas. U.S. Forces in the 
Persian Gulf were alerted to the probability of Significant Iranian 
military activity resulting from Iranian retaliation for recent Iraqis 
military successes. That period covered the fourth of July weekend 
During the afternoon and evening hours of 1 July /988 and 
continuing into the moming of 3 July /988, Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) armed small boats (Boghammers. and Boston 
Whalers) positioned themselves at the western approach to the Straits 
uf Hormuz (SOH). From this poSition, they were challenging merchant 
vessels, which has been a precursor to merchant ship attacks. On July 
1 1988, USS ELMER MON1GOMERY 11 was located .sufficiently close 
to a ship attack in progress as to respond to a request for distress 
assistance and to fire warning shots to ward off IRGC small boats 
attacking a merchant vessel, 
3 July Surface Engagement: 
On the morning of 3 July 1988, USS ELMER MONTGOMERY was 
on patrol in the northern portion of the Straits of Hormuz. At 
approximately 0330Z, USS MONTGOMERY observed .seven small 
10 A Standard miss ile (SM-2) is a me dium range m iu ile designed for s u r f~ce _tO _ 8 ;r 
e nga g e m e n ts 
II USS ELMER MON TG OM E RY is an Oliver H azard Perry CIa •• Frigate. de .igne d 
fo r a nti- s ubmar ine and a nti-air wufs rc 
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Iranian gunboats approaching a Pakistani merchant vessel. The small 
boats were reported by USS MONTGOMERY to have manned machine 
gun mounts and rocket launcher.s. 
Shortly thereafter, USS MONTGOMERY observed a total oj 13 
Iranian gun boats breaking into three groups. Each group contained 3 
to 4 gun boats with one group oj jour boats taking position off USS 
MONTGOMERY s port quarter. At 04112, USS MONTGOMERY 
heard the gun boats over bridge to bridge challenging merchant ships 
in the area. USS MON7GOMERY then heard 5 to 7 explosions coming 
from the north. At 04122. "Golf Sierra" 12 directed USS VINCENNES 
to proceed north to the vicinity oj USS MONTGOMERY and investigate 
USS MONTGOMERY s report oj small boats preparing to attack a 
merchant ship. USS VlNCENNESs helo (OCEAN LORD 25 / Lamps 
Mk III helo) on routine morning patrol, was vectored north to observe 
the Iranian small boat activity. USS VINCENNES was also monitoring 
a routine maritime patrol oj an Iranian P-3 operating to the west. At 
approximately 0615Z, the USS VINCENNESs helicopter was fired 
upon by one oj the small boats. USS VINCENNES then took tactical 
command of USS MON1GOMERY and both ships proceeded to close 
the position ojthe helicopter and the smull boats at high speed As USS 
VINCENNES and USS MON1GOMERY approached the position oj the 
small boats, two of them were observed to turn towards USS 
VINCF.NNES and USS MONIGOMERY. The closing action was 
interpreted as a ckmonstration oj hostile intent USS VINCENNES 
then requested and was given permission by CJTFME to engage the 
small boats with gunfire. At approximately 0643Z, USS VINCENNES 
opened fire andwas actively involved in the surface engagement from 
the time Iran Air flight 655 took off from Bondar Abbas through the 
downing of Iran Air flight 655. 
During the course of the gun engagement ojthe Iranian small boats, 
the USS VINCENNES, at approximately 0654Z, had maneuvered into a 
position one mile west of the centerline of civilian airway Amber 59. 
lhe USS SIDES 13, trlmSiting from east to west through the SOH, was 
approximately 18 miles to the east and became involved in the evolVing 
tactical situation. 
12 Golf Sierra i ~ the c, U sign of the Anti-Surface Warfare Comm ander. 
13 USS SIDES, another Oliv cr Hazard Pe rry Class Frigate , wu a l ~ o assign cd to the 
Persian Gulf. 
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Bondar Abbas Ilran Air flight 655/ air engagement: 
On 3 July 19fi8, at approximately 0647Z, an Iran Air Airhus 300, 
Iran Air flight 655, ,ook oJ! from the Bandar Ahbas joint military / 
civilian airport destined jor Dubai airport, The flight was a rrm/ine 
scheduled, inferno/iana/flight via commercial airway Amher 59. 14 
Jlincennel" - Critical Decision Windqw; 
At approximately 0647Z • Iran Air flight 655 was detected hy the 
USS VINCENNEs ANISPY-1A radar hearing 025 degrees, 47 N,'"f /5 . 
and WID assigned IN 413/ 16. The aircraft continued to close USS 
VINCENNES with a constant bearing, decreasing range. At 
approXimately 0649Z, USS VJNCENN}''S issued warnings on Military 
Air Distress (MAD) (243.00 Mhz) and at 0650Z began warnings on 
International Air Distress (lAD) (121.5 Mhz) to TN 4/3/ located 025 
degrees, 40NM from USS VJNCENNES. 
At approximately 06502 - several USS VINCENNES CIC personnel 
heard, on internal Combat Information Center (CIC) voice circuits, a 
report of F-I4 activity. A momentary Mode /l-IIOO IFF 17 indication 
was detected which was correlated with an iranian F-U. 7his was 
reported throughout CIC over internal CIC voice circuits. Contirmous 
MAD and lAD wan/ings were ordered at 30NM (5 total warnings on 
MAD and 4 totai warnings on lAD). USS VINCENNES continued the 
surface engagement and experience a foul bore in Mount 51 18. In 
order to unmask the after gun mount, full rudder (at 30 knots) was 
applied 7his added to the increasing tension in Cle. 
14 Co mmercial air way . are 20 miles wide, the lat itude and longitude of the centcr of 
the ai r la ne are publisbed a nd readily ava ila ble 
15 A nautica l mile (NM) i . a unit of meu urem e nt at . ea . bued on the le ngth of a 
minute or arc of a great circle oftbe eartb-equal to 2000 yard •. 
16 Track number (TN) i. how the N a vy Tac tical Data System (NTDS) distingui shc . 
between different contact •. E ach contacl i. n .igned its o wn tack. number , commonly 
referred \0 as ~tnck four one thre e one " 
17 Ident ification l'rie nd or Foe (IFF) i . an e lectron ic challenge and reply .ystem tha t 
uniquely identifies ai rcraft . T hi3 sy.tern i. required on alla irenft 
18 M o unt 51 i. the forward 5 ineh gunmount luc!led UII the forecastle; the after 
gunmount, Mount 52, i. lu cated n ear the 3tern 
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At approximately 06512 - as TN 4131 closed to 28 NM, USS 
VINCENNES informed CJTFME that she had a closing Iranian F-14, 
which she intended to engage at 20NM unless it turned away. USS 
VINCENNES requested concurrence. CJIFME concurred but told USS 
VINCENNES to warn the aircraft before firing. Warnings continued, 
but no response from TN 4131 was received, nor did it tum away. 
At approximately 06522 - warnings confinued over both lAD and 
MAD. Still no response. Although TN 4131 reached the 20 NMpoint, 
the CO decided not to engage. The order was given to illuminate the 
contact withfire control radar. There were noESJ"f19 indications. TN 
4/3/ was ascending through 10,000feet. 
At approximately 06532, at 15-16 NM, the last warning over lAD 
was given by USS SIDES to the aircraft bearing 204 degrees to USS 
VINCENNES, range 15.5 NM. During the last 30 seconds of this 
minute, the CO made his decision to engage TN 4131. 
At approximately 06542, the CO turned the firing key. 1wo SM-2 
Blk J/ missiles left the rails. They intercepted Iran Air flight 655 at a 
range of8 NM from USS VINCENNES at an altitude of 13,500 feet. 
(Fogarty, 1988. pp. 4-6.) 
19 Electronic Survei llance M enure. (ESM) i. used to dcte ct el ectron ic emiss ion s, it is 
uscd to ass is t in id entification. Its function is s imilar to • high -tech radar detector, 
commonly used in ca u 
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APPENDIX B. SCREENS OF THE COMMAND FUNCTION 
This Appendix displays the supplemental interface screens of the Command 
Function. The prototype di splays included in this appendix are: 
• Aviation Department 
• Combat Systems 
• Deck Department 
• Embarked Forces 
• Engineering Department 
• Navigation 
• Operations Department 
• Supply Department 
• Special Evolutions Default 
• Aircraft Launch 
• Small Boat Operations 
• Man over board 
• Special Report 
• Underway Replenishment 
• Ship Defense 
Each screen is a collection of information display elements. The display 
elements of each screen are listed in Tables 7 and 8, on pages 33 and 35 respectively. 
Certain screens are not included in this section. The Main Default Screen, and the Sea 
Detail Screen are on page 37 and 39. Displays for anchoring, and damage control-
fire and flooding-have already been designed and developed NAVSEA sponsored 
contractors. These displays should be iteratively reviewed to ensure they provide the 
basic user-defined requirements, and that they adhere to sound design principles. A 
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weapon firing display is also not included, This interface in-and-of-itself is worthy of 
extensive research and should be addressed separately. 
These displays are prototyp~s, and accordingly they represent a proposed draft 
of the Command Function characteristics. To ensure a successful design of the of the 
Command Function interface, these displays must be continually critiqued and 
modified with the intended user in mind. The prototype screens that follow are 
reproductions from an interface development tool, AsymetrixTlll Multimedia 
ToolbookTM; they were designed to be displayed on a 21 or 25 inch high-resolution 
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